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An Experimental Study of Adaptive Behavior in an Oligopolistic Market Game Rosemarie Nagel, Universitat Pompeu Fabra Nicolaas J. Vriend, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1999, Vol. 9, Issue 1, p. 27-65 [Also appeared in: U. Cantner, H. Hanusch, & S. Klepper (Eds.), Economic Evolution, Learning, and Complexity, Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg, 2000, p. 33-71] 
Full paper (PDF format)
Abstract.
We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are
competing firms in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The
consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide
how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide
upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in
order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the
players do not have a well-specified model of their environment. Our main
objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of the players in such
a situation. Nick Vriend, n.vriend@qmul.ac.uk Last modified 2016-02-05 |