Evolving Market Structure: An ACE Model of Price Dispersion and Loyalty Alan P. Kirman, E.H.E.S.S., GREQAM, Marseille, France Nicolaas J. Vriend, Queen Mary, University of London Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2001, Vol. 25, Nos. 3/4, p. 459-502 Full paper (PDF format) Abstract.
We present an Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) model of the
wholesale fish market in Marseille. Two of the stylized facts of that
market are high loyalty of buyers to sellers, and persistent price
dispersion, although it is every day the same population of sellers and
buyers that meets in the same market hall. In our ACE model, sellers
decide on quantities to supply, prices to ask, and how to treat loyal
customers, while buyers decide which sellers to visit, and which prices to
accept. Learning takes place through reinforcement. The model explains
both stylized facts price dispersion and high loyalty. In a coevolutionary
process, buyers learn to become loyal as sellers learn to offer higher
utility to loyal buyers, while these sellers, in turn, learn to offer
higher utility to loyal buyers as they happen to realize higher gross
revenues from loyal buyers. The model also explains the effect of
heterogeneity of the buyers. We analyze how this leads to subtle
differences in the shopping patterns of the different types of buyers, and
how this is related to the behavior of the sellers in the market. Nick Vriend, n.vriend@qmul.ac.uk Last modified 2024-10-07 |