A Model of Market-making Nicolaas J. Vriend, Queen Mary, University of London European Journal of Economic and Social Systems, 2001, Vol. 15, No. 3, p. 187-202 Full paper (PDF format) Abstract.
The two essential features of a decentralized economy taken
into account are, first, that individual agents need some
information about other agents in order to meet potential
trading partners, which requires some communication or
interaction between these agents, and second, that in
general agents will face trading uncertainty. We consider
trade in a homogeneous commodity. Firms decide upon their
effective supplies, and may create their own markets by
sending information signals communicating their willingness
to sell. Meeting of potential trading partners is arranged
in the form of shopping by consumers. The questions to be
considered are: How do firms compete in such markets? And
what are the properties of an equilibrium? We establish
existence conditions for a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the
firms' strategies, and analyze its characteristics. The
developed framework appears to lend itself well to study
many typical phenomena of decentralized economies, such as
the emergence of central markets, the role of middlemen, and
price-making. Nick Vriend, n.vriend@qmul.ac.uk Last modified 2016-02-05 |